|
I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at York University, where I am also a member of the Centre for Vision Research and a Core Member of the Vision: Science to Applications (VISTA) program. From 2018-2019, I was a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Philosophical Psychology, at the University of Antwerp. I received my PhD in Philosophy from UCLA in Spring 2018. Before that, I got my MA in Philosophy at Brandeis University. I went to college at Montana State University in Bozeman, MT, where I grew up.
I am the recipient of a SSHRC Insight Development Grant for my project Forms of Mind, which investigates the structural warrant that perception supplies to beliefs in virtue of the format or structure of perceptual states. Together with Chaz Firestone, I organize the phiVis: Philosophy of Vision Science Workshop, a satellite event at the annual meeting of the Vision Sciences Society. The workshop aims to promote interaction between philosophers of perception and vision scientists. My last name is pronounced: LAN-dee (IPA: 'lændiː) |
I work mainly in the philosophy of mind, psychology, and perception. I study how we perceive the world to be organized, how our perception of the world is itself organized, and how the structure of perception relates to the perception of structure. My research brings together two types of approaches. First, I take the approach of a philosopher of science in trying to identify the core concepts and commitments that make a productive science of the mind possible. Second, I take the approach of naturalistic philosophy of mind: I take the core concepts and commitments that underlie the cognitive sciences, as well as specific experimental findings, as a guide in addressing basic philosophical questions about the nature of the mind and knowledge.
My research focuses specifically on the codes or structures of our mental states. The distinction between process and structure is foundational to cognitive science: there are neural and psychological processes and there are the structures that get processed. The idea that our mental states have a complex "structure" or "code"––that they are organized from more basic components––can seem pretty abstract. And in practice, it is often unclear when we are talking about properties of how a structure is processed or used vs. structural properties of what is being processed. My work is guided by the idea that we can gain important insights into the representational, epistemic, and subjective natures of our mental states by getting clear about how those mental states are structured in addition to how they are used. |
Recent Papers:
|