Who am I?

I’m a philosopher at York University, where I directed the Cognitive Science Program from 2022 to 2025. Before York, I was a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for Philosophical Psychology at the University of Antwerp. I received my PhD from UCLA and my MA from Brandeis, and went to college at Montana State in Bozeman, where I grew up. 

Together with Chaz Firestone, I organize the phiVis: Philosophy of Vision Science Workshop, a satellite event at the annual meeting of the Vision Sciences Society, which aims to promote interaction between philosophers of perception and vision scientists. I am also a co-organizer of the Ontario Mind Group, which meets regularly in Toronto to discuss philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

What do I do?

Broadly: I work in philosophy of cognitive science (especially vision science) and mind, with connections to epistemology, AI (especially computer vision), and philosophy of language. As a philosopher of science, I try to identify the main ideas that make a productive science of the mind possible. As a naturalistic philosopher of mind, I use scientific findings and frameworks as a guide to addressing basic philosophical questions about the nature of the mind and knowledge.

Specifically: One of the great challenges of modern science is to understand the immense creative powers of thought and language—our abilities to produce, understand, and communicate an infinite variety of spontaneous thoughts and plans. But impressive too is the immense receptivity of the mind to the immediate circumstances in which it finds itself. The mind is capable of perceiving endlessly different kinds of objects and events in different arrangements. The creativity of thought and language is thought to be rooted in the power of composition—roughly, the ability to represent something by combining more elementary representations. My work argues that the receptivity of perception is also rooted in compositional abilities to code stimulus features in terms of more elementary stimulus features. I examine the various schemes the mind employs to compose a perspective on the world, and the significance of these schemes for our subjective, representational, and epistemic standing.

Selected papers