
CONTACT INFORMATION	Department of Philosophy University of California, Los Angeles 390 Portola Plaza 321 Dodd Hall, UCLA Los Angeles, CA 90095-1451 USA	<i>E-mail:</i> lande@humnet.ucla.edu <i>Phone:</i> (510) 646-6178 <i>Website:</i> www.kevinlande.com
AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION	Philosophy of Mind; Philosophy of Perception; Philosophy of Psychology & Cognitive Science; Philosophy of Language	
AREAS OF COMPETENCE	Epistemology; Metaphysics; Philosophy of Science; Formal Semantics; Logic; Phenomenology	
EDUCATION	<p>University of California, Los Angeles Ph.D., Philosophy, 2018 (expected)</p> <p>Dissertation: "Parts of Perception" Committee: Tyler Burge (Chair), Sam Cumming, Gabe Greenberg, Phil Kellman</p> <p>Brandeis University M.A., Philosophy, 2011</p> <p>Montana State University, Bozeman B.A. (Highest Honors), Philosophy, 2009 B.A. (Highest Honors), Political Science, 2009 University Honors Baccalaureate (Highest Distinction), 2009</p>	
FELLOWSHIPS, GRANTS, & AWARDS	2016-7	Rudolf and Ina Carnap Essay Prize for Excellence in Writing, UCLA
	2015-6	Rudolf and Ina Carnap Essay Prize for Excellence in Writing, UCLA
	2015-6	Edwin W. Pauley Fellowship, UCLA
	2014-5	Edward A. Dickson History of Art Fellowship, UCLA
	2014	Graduate Summer Research Mentorship, UCLA
	2014	Graduate Summer Research Mentorship Travel Grant, UCLA
	2013	Graduate Summer Research Mentorship, UCLA
	2011-2	Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship of Distinction, UCLA
	2010	Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Travel Grant, Brandeis University
	2009	Special Merit Scholarship, Brandeis University
PUBLICATIONS	"The Perspectival Character of Perception," forthcoming in <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i>	
REFEREED PRESENTATIONS	<p>"Do We Perceive Perspectival Properties?" 2nd IIFs-UNAM Philosophy Graduate Conference, at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; Mar 2016</p> <p>"Is Perception Compositional?" Semantics and Philosophy in Europe (Eighth Colloquium), at University of Cambridge; Sep 2015</p> <p>"Computation, Representation, and Empirical Consequences" (poster), Society for Philosophy and Psychology, at University of British Columbia; Jun 2014</p> <p>"Realizing Functions: Functionalism and Indeterminacy," Interdisciplinary Graduate Conference on Consciousness, at Boston University; May 2011</p> <p>"Realizing Functions: Functionalism and Indeterminacy," 4th Annual Graduate Philosophy Conference, at Western Michigan University; Dec 2010</p> <p>"Quine and the Revisability of Logic: The Revisability Paradox and Logical Implication," Conference on Foundations of Logical Consequence, at Arché</p>	

Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology,
University of St. Andrews; Jun 2010

INVITED
PRESENTATIONS

“Consciousness and the Format of Perception,” The Quale 3rd Interdisciplinary
Academic Symposium, UCLA; Nov 2017

“Percepts, Pictures, and Their Parts,” Representation, Meaning, and Content
Workshop, at Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition, University of Turin; Jul 2017

“The View from the Great Wave,” UCLA-LACMA Symposium: Art Historical
Theories and Methodologies; Mar 2015

DEPARTMENTAL
TALKS

“Parts of Perception,” UCLA Albritton Society; Nov 2017

“Why Perception Isn’t Logical,” UCLA Mind and Language Workshop, Nov 2017

“Perceptual Composition,” UCLA Mind and Language Workshop; May 2017

“The Structure of Perceptual Representations,” UCLA Mind and Language
Workshop; Feb 2017

“The Spatial Unity of Perception,” NYU Philosophy of Mind/Consciousness
Discussion Group; Oct 2016

“The Spatial Unity of Perception,” UCLA Mind and Language Workshop; May 2016

“Another Look at Slanted Coins,” UCLA Albritton Society; Nov 2014

PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY

“O Ant, Where Art Thou,” for *The Daily Ant*. (May 12, 2017)
www.dailyant.com/2017/05/12/philosophy-phriday-o-ant-where-art-thou/

PRIMARY
INSTRUCTOR

University of California, Los Angeles

Upper Division:

Phenomenology, Summer 2016

Philosophy of Psychology, Summer 2015

Philosophy of Language, Summer 2013

Lower Division:

Introduction to Philosophy of Mind, Summer 2017

TEACHING
FELLOW

University of California, Los Angeles

Upper Division:

Theory of Knowledge (Michael Rescorla), Fall 2017

Saul Kripke’s *Naming and Necessity* (David Kaplan), Spring 2017

Existentialism (Justin Jennings), Summer 2014

History of Modern Philosophy, 1650-1800 (Calvin Normore), Spring 2014

Contemporary Philosophy of Science (Sheldon Smith), Winter 2014

Philosophy of Mind (Tyler Burge), Fall 2013

Philosophy of Psychology (Tyler Burge), Winter 2013

Lower Division:

Introduction to Ethical Theory, Writing Intensive (Pamela Hieronymi), Winter 2017

Meaning and Communication (Joshua Armstrong), Spring 2016

Introduction to Philosophy of Mind (Gabriel Greenberg), Spring 2013

Introduction to Philosophy of Science (Katrina Elliot), Fall 2012

Harvard Summer School

Lower Division:

Introduction to Philosophy (Andreas Teuber), Summer 2010 & 2011

Brandeis University

Upper Division:

Consciousness, Brain, and Self (Jerry Samet), Fall 2010

Lower Division:

Introduction to Philosophy (Barislav Marušić), Spring 2010

Introduction to Symbolic Logic (Jerry Samet), Fall 2009

REFEREEING

Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 2016

USC-UCLA Graduate Philosophy Conference, 2012-4

The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2013

DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE

University of California, Los Angeles

Graduate Student Representative, 2013-4

“Social Czar,” 2012-3

Brandeis University

Organizer of Graduate Student Speaker Series, 2010

Graduate Conference Committee, 2009-2010

Brown Bag Lecturer Series Committee, 2009-2010

GRADUATE COURSEWORK (* = AUDITED)

Philosophy of Mind and Epistemology

UCLA

The Contents of Visual Experience (René Jagnow), Spring 2016

Philosophy of Psychology (Tyler Burge), Winter 2016

Epistemic Warrant and Epistemic Entitlement (Tyler Burge), Spring 2015

The Conceptual Mind (Mark Greenberg), Winter 2015

Warrant and Entitlement (Mark Greenberg), Spring 2014

Perception and Pre-Conceptual Thought (Tyler Burge), Winter 2014

Perception (Tyler Burge), Winter 2013

First Year Seminar: Mind and Action (Andrew Hsu), Spring 2012

Cognition (Gabriel Greenberg), Winter 2012

Philosophy of Mind (Tyler Burge), Fall 2011

New York University

*The Cognition/Perception Border (Ned Block and Eric Mandelbaum), Fall 2016

Brandeis

Philosophy of Action (Barislav Marušić), Fall 2010

Philosophy of Cognitive Science (Jerry Samet), Spring 2010

Innateness (Jerry Samet), Fall 2009

Philosophy of Language and Logic

UCLA

*Semantics of Visual Narrative (Samuel Cumming), Spring 2016

History of Set Theory (Tony Martin), Winter 2016

Iconic/Symbolic (Gabriel Greenberg), Spring 2015

Truth and Imprecision (Joshua Armstrong), Fall 2014

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (David Kaplan, Andrew Hsu, Gavin Lawrence, Tony Martin), Fall 2013 & Winter 2014

*Discourse Relations and Narrative (Samuel Cumming), Spring 2013

Pictorial Semantics (Gabriel Greenberg), Winter 2013

Vagueness (Samuel Cumming, Ed Stabler), Spring 2012

Metalogic (Tony Martin), Spring 2012

First Year Seminar: Language (David Kaplan, Samuel Cumming), Winter 2012
Introduction to Theory of Computation (Gabriel Greenberg), Fall 2011

Brandeis

*Consequence and Conditionals (Jennifer Smalligan Marušić)
*Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Eli Hirsch, William Flesch), Spring 2011
Hilary Putnam (Alan Berger—Harvard), Spring 2011
Mathematical Logic (Alan Berger), Spring 2010
Saul Kripke (Alan Berger), Spring 2010
W.V.O. Quine (Alan Berger), Fall 2009

Tufts

Ordinary Language Philosophy (Avner Baz), Fall 2009

Philosophy of Science

Natural Kinds at Every Level? (Katrina Elliot), Spring 2016
Ceteris Paribus Laws (Sheldon Smith), Fall 2014
Abduction (Samuel Cumming, Sheldon Smith), Spring 2014
Explanation (Katrina Elliot), Winter 2014

Metaphysics

UCLA

*Meta-metaphysics (Sheldon Smith), Fall 2013

Brandeis

Metaphysics (Eli Hirsch), Spring 2010
Philosophical Problems (Robert Greenberg), Fall 2009

Value Theory

UCLA

Responsibility, Naturalism, and P.F. Strawson (Pamela Hieronymi), Fall 2012
First Year Seminar: Ethics (Seana Shiffrin), Fall 2011
Political Authority and the Foundations of Democracy (David Plunkett), Fall 2011

Brandeis

Proseminar: Meta-ethical Theory (Kate Moran), Fall 2009

History of Philosophy

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Barbara Herman), Spring 2013
Spinoza (Joseph Almog, John Carriero), Winter 2012

Psychology

*Animal Cognition (Aaron Blaisdell), Winter 2016
Perception (Ladan Shams), Winter 2013

Linguistics

Dynamic Semantics (Jessica Rett), Winter 2015
Formal Semantics II: Intensional Semantics (Yael Sharvit), Spring 2013
Modal Logic (Ed Stabler), Spring 2013

Art History

Art Historical Methods and Theory (Miwon Kwon), Winter 2015

Pedagogy

Teaching College Philosophy (Andrew Jewell), Fall 2012

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT: PARTS OF PERCEPTION

When you see a penny head-on, you see it as circular. If you view it at an angle, you will still see it as circular, even though there is a sense in which it now has an elliptical appearance—you would draw an ellipse on a piece of paper in order to depict the tilted coin. But you do not see the coin as elliptical in shape. So, in what sense does the tilted coin have an “elliptical appearance”? This example illustrates the perspectival character of perception. Given that you can correctly see the shape of the coin, it is puzzling why your perspective on the coin shapes the way you see it. Why don’t we perceive things as if from an Archimedean point, with a “God’s eye” view? From G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell to Susanna Schellenberg, many have tried to elucidate the perspectival character of perception. The most common strategy is to characterize the elliptical appearance of the coin as an object (a *sense-datum*) or a property (*perspectival ellipticality*) that we perceive. In my dissertation, I argue for a different view: the perspectival character of perception depends on the *structure* of our perceptual states.

My account assumes that perceptual states can be *complex*—they can have parts. The state you are in when you perceive a table is made up of states of perceiving the sizes, shapes, and colors of the tabletop and of the legs. These perceptual states themselves have parts, though they are not so easily identified. The claim that perceptual states have parts is foundational to contemporary psychology and is a central subject of my dissertation. I take a non-reductive approach to clarifying this claim. Rather than trying to say *what it is* for a psychological state to have part-whole structure, I focus on *what empirical regularities we can explain* with the notion. For one, a perceptual state’s structure helps to explain how that state is formed and used. Why is your perception of a coin’s shape influenced by your perception of how patches of the coin’s surface are tilted? Because your states of perceiving how those patches are tilted are *parts* of your state of perceiving the coin’s shape. The part-whole structures of perceptual states also help to explain which perceptual states are possible or not. We normally cannot perceive the shape of a surface without perceiving its orientation. This is because the state of perceiving a surface’s shape normally has as parts states of perceiving of how points on that surface are oriented.

I argue that the state you are in when you perceive the coin’s surface is structured like an array of constituent perceptual states that represent—that is, are about—the points on the coin’s surface (see David Marr, Christopher Peacocke, and Tyler Burge). A component perceptual state’s place in the array, like a pixel’s place in a digital photograph, corresponds to the line of sight along which it represents a bit of surface. This is not a claim about the way our neurons are arranged, but rather about the way perceptual states are organized from sub-states, however they are realized in the brain. Perception differs markedly from thought, I argue, in that the very ways perceptual states combine reflect spatial relationships between the things being perceived. One constraint on how perceptions of surface patches can combine into a perception of a whole surface is that the perceived patches must be near each other. To account for this sort of constraint, we should posit that states of perceiving surface patches have places in an abstract array and that these states can combine into a perception of a whole surface only if the states have nearby places in the array.

I suggest that the simplest parts of our visual perceptions of surfaces represent tiny bits of those surfaces. But the way we perceive the world cannot be a product of just adding together the contents of these pixel-like perceptions. Perceptual context effects, where the way you perceive one thing depends on your perception of other things, are ubiquitous. We see a surface patch as lighter or darker depending on what neighboring patches we see. How do perceptions of individual points on the coin assemble into veridical perceptions of determinate colors and, moreover, holistic properties such as *circularity* and *symmetry*? Adapting concepts from philosophy of language and formal semantics, I defend a principle of compositionality for perception: the content of a perceptual state depends entirely on the contents of that state’s parts and the way they are combined. I defend this principle against hard cases by developing refined

accounts of the ways perceptual states combine. These forms of combination correspond to regularities in the geometries of surfaces and their spatial relationships, relative to certain frames of reference. You see the coin veridically if your perceptions of the points on the coin's surface combine in the right manner within the representational array, reflecting how those points relate to us, each other, and nearby surfaces.

We can now explain, among other things, the perspectival character of perception. Compare the state you are in when you view the tilted coin and the state you are in when you view a head-on ellipse that would perfectly occlude the tilted coin. A perceptual state's place in the representational array corresponds to the line of sight in which the perceived point is located. Since the tilted coin and the head-on ellipse occupy all the same lines of sight, your array-like states of perceiving the tilted coin and the head-on ellipse are structured in the same way from their constituent states. I argue that this similarity in structure accounts for the "elliptical appearance" of the coin. At the same time, you correctly see the coin as circular, and not elliptical, because the state you are in when you perceive the coin includes states of perceiving the points on the coins surface as *tilted*. Your perceptual states are both *veridical* and *perspectival* because of how they are organized. In this way, my work sets up a framework for understanding the nature of perception by examining the nature of perceptual parts and the ways in which they combine to give rise to a rich perception of the world.

For a detailed, chapter-by-chapter summary of my dissertation, you may visit:
<http://www.files.kevinlande.com/DissertationSummary.pdf>

REFERENCES

Letters of recommendation from each of these individuals are on file and may be obtained by contacting Tanya Kim, at philcounselor@humnet.ucla.edu.

Tyler Burge (committee chair)

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